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A novel phase transition behavior is observed in the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem
where large number (N) of agents or customers or players collectively (and iteratively) learn
to choose among the N unranked restaurants where she would be alone that evening and
would get the only dish available there that evening (or may get randomly picked up if more
than one customer arrive there that evening). The players evolve their strategy such that the
publicly available information about past crowd in different restaurants can be utilized and
each of them are able to make the best minority choice. Following a crowd-avoiding strategy
indicated above, each of the ni(t − 1) number of agents arriving at the i-th restaurant in
the last (t − 1)-th evening chooses this t-th evening to go back to the same i-th restaurant
with weight [ni(t− 1)]−α and with weight 1/(N − 1) for the other restaurants. We study
the steady state (t-independent) utilization fraction f of f(t) = [1−∑Ni=1[δ(ni(t))/N ]]. We
find, near αc = 0+, (1−f) ∝ (α−αc)β with β = 0.62±0.01 and the convergence time τ (for
f(t) becoming independent of t) varies as τ ∝ (α− αc)−γ , with γ = 1.66± 0.06 (fluctuation
in τ also grows as ∆τ ∝ (α− αc)−γ˜ , with γ˜ = 1.33± 0.02).
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2I. INTRODUCTION
We study the steady state statistics and the phase transition behavior of the Kolkata Paise
Restaurant (KPR) problem [1, 2]. KPR is a well-studied many-agent (player) and many-choice
repeated game, where the agents collectively learn from past mistakes, how to share the limited
resources. In this kind of games, each agent tries to anticipate and choose her own strategy, every
time (learning from the publicly available past informations) in parallel mode (unguided; in absence
of any dictator or non-playing instructor). The restaurants are assumed to prepare every evening
fixed meal plates which are equally priced (hence no budget constraint for customers). Only the
crowd avoidance abilities determines the individual success in securing meal on any or successive
evenings.
Specifically, we consider here the case of N restaurants and N agents or customers or players who
decide every evening (on the basis of informations about the past evenings, available to everyone),
which restaurant to choose such that she is alone there and gets the meal. Each restaurant is
assumed to, for simplicity, prepare one dish every evening (generalization does not help getting
any insight at this stage). For more than one person arriving any restaurant any evening, a
randomly chosen one will get the meal and rest (arriving there) will not get any that evening. We
do not consider any ranking of these restaurants here.
Although every evening each of the N restaurants prepares one dish and in-principle everyone is
entitled to a dish every evening, overcrowding due to stochasticity of choices make the probability of
success for each customer less than unity in such (democratic) games. Indeed, a dictated solution
would be very efficient: the dictator asks everyone to form a queue and visit the restaurants
according to the position in the queue and then asks them to shift her position by one step in the
next evening (assuming periodic boundary condition). Everyone gets the food: No wastage, i.e.,
the steady state (t-independent) utilization fraction f = 1 (where f(t) = [1 −∑Ni=1[δ(ni(t))/N ]],
δ(n) = 1,0 for n = 0,1 respectively) and that too from the first evening (convergence time τ is
zero). This is true even when the restaurants have ranks (agreed by all the agents or customers).
However, in democracy, this dictated solution is not acceptable and each agent would like to (learn
from past experience and) decide on her own everytime which restaurant to choose such that she
is alone there and gets the meal. The more successful such collective learning is, the more is the
utilization fraction of the services. Question is, what is the maximum utilization fraction value
(f) and convergence time (τ) of such ‘learned’ democratic choices (due to individually learned
strategies) for a large society (N →∞). Note that the dictated solution gives full utilization (f =
31) and zero convergence time (τ = 0) for any N .
Assuming that no past history on restaurant occupancy is available i.e., no learning, let us
consider the process of randomly choosing any of the N restaurant by λN agents (we consider
λ = 1 in KPR game later). Then the probability of choosing any restaurant by m (> 1) agents
on evening t is P (m) =
(
λN
m
)
pm(1− p)λN−m where p = 1N ; giving P (m) = [λm/(m!)] exp(−λ) as
N →∞. Hence the fraction of restaurants not chosen on the same evening is P (m = 0) = exp(−λ),
and average fraction of restaurants filled or utilized on any evening f = 1− exp(−λ) ' 0.63 [1].
As we mentioned earlier, the agents try to learn from the past mistakes in making their respective
choices and can improve her chance to be in the minority with efficient learning strategy. We study
here the dynamics of the game with one such stochastic learning strategy.
II. LEARNING STRATEGY
We study the dynamics of KPR game played by N players or agents such that each evening each
of the players employ some stochastic (learning) strategy, helping her to choose among N number
of (equally ranked) restaurants, maximizing her chance of arriving at a vacant restaurant and get
the dish. We employ the following strategy: on day t, an agent goes back to her last day’s visited
restaurant k with probability Pk(t) = [nk(t− 1)]−α, if she was one of the nk(t− 1) agents arriving
there (k-th restaurant) last night. She chooses one among the rest of the (N − 1) equi-probable
restaurants k
′
(6= k) with probability Pk′ (t) = (1−Pk(t))/(N −1). If α = 0, then every evening she
will return to the first day’s chosen and visited restaurant, and the dynamics on successive days
become trivial. In this simulation study with α > 0, we found the steady state (for t ≥ τ(α), the
convergence time) value of the aggregated utilization fraction f = 1.0 for α→ αc, where αc = 0+.
We find the power laws (1-f) ∼ (α−αc)β , β ' 0.62 and τ ∼ (α−αc)−γ , γ ' 1.66. All simulations
are done with N = 500 and the steady averages upto a maximum learning steps (days/evenings)
of order 105.
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FIG. 1. Plot of (1− f) against α (f is steady state social utilization fraction), showing that (1− f) varies as
power of α, if on day t each agent returns to (t−1)-th day’s visited restaurant with probability [ni(t− 1)]−α,
else goes to any of (N − 1) restaurant randomly. We found that for α values near αc(= 0+), a power law
holds for (1 − f) ∼ (α − αc)β where β = 0.62 ± 0.01 (the straight line fit is from maximum likelihood
estimation). The inset plot shows direct functional relationship between (1− f) against α.
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FIG. 2. Plot of τ against α (τ is the convergence time to attain steady state), reflecting τ varying as power
of α, if at day t each of the ni(t− 1) agents return to (t− 1)-th day’s visited restaurant (i) with probability
[ni(t− 1)]−α, else goes to any of (N − 1) restaurant randomly. Again for α near αc = 0+ the power law
τ ∼ (α − αc)−γ holds, γ = 1.66 ± 0.06 (the straight line fit is from maximum likelihood estimation). The
inset plot shows direct functional relationship between τ and α.
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FIG. 3. Plot of ∆τ against α (∆τ is fluctuation in the steady state convergence time τ), showing that
∆τ varies as power of α in asymptotic limit, if on day t each of the ni(t − 1) agents return to (t − 1)th
day’s visited restaurant with probability [ni(t− 1)]−α, else goes to any of (N − 1) restaurant randomly. We
found the minimum value of αc for which the power law holds as ∆τ ∼ (α−αc)−γ˜ where γ˜ = 1.33± 0.05 is
αc = 0+ (the straight line fit is from maximum likelihood estimation). The inset plot shows direct functional
relationship between ∆τ and α.
III. SUMMARY & DISCUSSION
Social dynamics is a popular area of study which borrows techniques from statistical mechanics
to study the aggregated behavior of collective learning dynamics, based on individually chosen
strategy to be in the minority. We study the collective learning induced phase transition in the
Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) problem where N customers or players every evening choose one
of the N restaurants with the hope that she gets the only dish available in that restaurant that
evening (if reaches there alone or one is randomly picked up by the restaurant if more than one
customer arrive on evening) by evolving her strategy and based on the publicly available information
of past crowds for all the restaurants. The social utilization fraction f(t) = 1−∑Ni=1 δ(ni(t))N where
ni(t) represents the number of customers who choose the i-th restaurant for t-th evening (δ(n) = 1
for n = 0 and δ(n) = 0 for n > 0). The steady state corresponds to the case when f(t) = f
becomes t-independent (within limit). We show using Monte Carlo simulation, that when each
agent chooses the restaurant i depending on the past choice with probability pi(t) = [ni(t− 1)]−α
for the i-th restaurant where she landed up last evening (t − 1) along with [ni(t − 1) − 1] others,
and pj = [1 − pi(t)]/(N − 1) for all other restaurants (j 6= i), then 1 − f ' (α− αc)β, β ' 0.62
and αc = 0+ (see Fig. 1), while the convergence time τ (when f becomes τ independent, on
6average) grows as (α− αc)−γ , with γ ' 1.66 (see Fig. 2) and the fluctuation (∆τ) in τ diverges as
(α− αc)−γ˜ with γ˜ ' 1.33 around α→ αc = 0+ (see Fig. 3).
Earlier works [1, 3, 4] had already proposed several strategies to maximize the average social
utilization fraction f (see refs. [5–8] for further applications of the model in practical situations).
In this paper, we discuss a competitive resource allocation process such that following the proposed
learning rule (see section II), the process exhibits a phase transition at the critical point α = αc
which we find to be 0+ numerically (see Figs. 1-3): The value of f approaches unity as α → αc
(= 0+, see Fig. 1) following a power law and the convergence time τ grows very fast following
another power law (see Fig. 2) as α approaches αc. We hope, further studies on this phase
transition behavior for the practical cases considered in refs. [5–8] will contribute significantly in
social science. However such studies also face the formidable challenges to accommodate effectively
the ranking of the restaurants, which we have not considered here.
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